What happens when psychoanalysis encounters Deleuze? Ultimately, the result is its transformation into schizoanalysis, of course, thanks in large part to the collaboration with Guattari. But Deleuze brings to the encounter a whole set of conceptual resources derived from Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Nietzsche, Bergson and Jung, just as Guattari brings to the collaboration invaluable resources derived from Marx, Hjelmslev and Lacan. 1 We start with Nietzsche for a number of reasons: first of all, because Nietzsche is the most important of the three great materialists (including Freud) on whom Deleuze will draw in AntiOedipus, and because it is he who provides the most capacious sense of unconsciousness. For
Nietzsche, human being expresses will-to-power, and will-to-power is mostly unconscious;
consciousness is strictly epiphenomenal. Moreover, what consciousness there is for Nietzsche is transitory and unreliable: the psyche is a battleground for warring forces or perspectives, and consciousness represents merely the momentary victory of one partial perspective over others -or indeed its disguise, as something other than conquering force. Most importantly, though:
Nietzsche provides important correctives to Kant, one of Deleuze's most favored and influential philosophical precursors, despite his idealism.
Where Nietzsche (probably in response to Kant himself) fractured the psyche, Kant sought to unify the psyche and harmonize its faculties; to systematize knowledge by bringing the intuitions of sensibility into consistent correspondence with the concepts of understanding under the supervision of the regulative Ideas of Reason (Self, World, and God). Even where Kant recognizes that sensible experience can have no corresponding concept --as in the case of the sublime --he subjects intuition to Reason (and the Idea of infinity). Following Nietzsche, Deleuze will dissect, disaggregate and disorganize the Kantian psyche, yet without dismissing some of its parts altogether. Using the sublime as a kind of wedge, Deleuze refutes Kant's three regulative Ideas of reason as well as the Transcendental Unity of Apperception that would add a unified subject ("I think") to all experience: as a general rule rather than the exception, experience defies subsumption by the understanding and becomes Problematic; not only is God long since dead, but the Self is not self-identical (it is composed of partial and competing larval selves, instead) and the World is not completely or even predominantly knowable (it is instead composed of ephemeral islands of Being all but submerged in chaos and indeterminacy). 3 The very forms of space and time that our experience takes are not the product of conscious intention; the syntheses of the imagination, meanwhile, will continue to produce experience, but no longer under the aegis of Reason and understanding: consciousness is not the subject of but rather subject to the syntheses --which Deleuze will insist on calling "passive" syntheses for this very reason. Even the third synthesis of recognition in Anti-Oedipus, when conscious awareness finally supervenes ("So that's what that was!" 4 ), occurs to the subject rather than being under its conscious control (as Wittgenstein aptly illustrates with the composite figure of the duck-rabbit which we alternately "see as" as one or the other, more or less involuntarily 5 ).
Without the premise of a unified sovereign subject governed by Reason, much of the productive activity of the Kantian psyche turns out to be unconscious, and we become conscious of it -if we ever do -only ex post facto.
Bergson's sense of unconsciousness, like Nietzsche's, relates it more directly to action than to experience and cognition, and situates it in a broadly ethological rather than a narrower psychological context. 6 For Bergson, consciousness represents the interruption of an otherwise automatic or autonomic "sensory-motor schema" that ordinarily relates a specific responsebehavior to a perceptual trigger in the environment. Behavior that is completely determined by instinct --Deleuze is fond of citing the tick's "drop!" response to the trigger-scent of the chemicals in mammalian sweat --leaves no room for conscious thought, or what Bergson calls intelligence. But actual human behavior, not being completely determined instinctually, alternates or is supplemented with intelligent contemplation, reflection, and recollection.
Rather than trigger an immediate behavioral response, a perceived image may inspire reverie, or may recall images from the past. Whereas in Freud's analysis of neurosis, repression of a specific traumatic past deforms action in the present, for Bergson conscious human action in the present requires repression of the past as a whole, or at least repression of most of the past, except when specific elements of the past are brought to bear on a situation requiring action in the present. So for Bergson, most of the past remains unconscious most of the time, except when hesitation to act in the present calls some portion of the past to consciousness in order to help perform an action, or when completely free from any demands for present action we contemplate the past for its own sake. As Deleuze insists in an early essay, the past in itself "is the unconscious, or more precisely, as Bergson says, the virtual" [DI 29]. So for Bergson and
Deleuze, a philosophical unconscious --the virtual past as a co-existing whole --emerges out and because of the gap in non-instinctually-determined human being between perception and action.
And yet humans are by no means purely contemplative beings: they act, and they act to some degree in accord with instinct and to a large degree in response to perceptions. So what bridges the gap between perception and action in human being? For Bergson, the bridge depends on the interplay of instinct and intelligence. And it is significant in this regard that just before devoting an entire essay to Bergson and just after publishing his first book, on Hume,
Deleuze wrote a short introductory essay on "Instincts and Institutions": for the essay adopts the Bergsonian framework of instinct and intelligence, albeit without mentioning Bergson by name, and adopts the focus on institutions characteristic of Hume. 7 Instincts and institutions are the two forms mobilized to solve the Problem of satisfying what Deleuze prudently calls "tendencies". Instinctually, satisfaction is direct and determinate: the tick drops and must obtain mammalian blood, or die. In institutions, satisfaction is indirect and under-determined:
the various means or objects of satisfaction never correspond intrinsically to the tendency.
"The same sexual needs will never explain the multiple possible forms of marriage....
Tendencies are satisfied by means that do not depend on them.... [and] no tendency exists which is not at the same time constrained or harassed, and thus transformed, sublimated -to such an extent that neurosis is possible" [DI 20 ]. Instincts and institutions form a continuum:
the more perfect and exclusive the match between tendency and object, the greater the role of an instinct common to the entire species; the more variable the objects of satisfaction, the greater the role of intelligence rooted in historically and/or geographically specific tools and institutions (or of neurosis in a particular individual). Deleuze thus takes Bergson one step further, or provides greater clarity: even when the sensory-motor gap is bridged by a reflective determination of what appears "useful," any such sense of utility for human being is defined socially and institutionally:
human utility is always something other than mere utility. The institution sends us back to a social activity that is constitutive of models of which we are not conscious, and which are not explained either by tendencies or by utility, since the latter, as human utility, presupposes tendencies in the first place. [DI 20; translation modified]
So institutions provide socio-historically specific behavioral models for matching a wide range of objects to tendencies, and these contingent models (which Hume would call habits) may be as unconscious as those provided by instinct.
We end with Jung, not only because he developed a notion of unconsciousness in direct contradistinction to Freud's, but also because he derived that notion explicitly from Kant and
Bergson. Jung's differences with Freud are well-known; three are particularly important to
Deleuze. First of all, and most generally, whereas Freud's understanding of psychodynamics was based squarely on neurosis, and therefore could accommodate psychosis only cursorily and with great difficulty, Jung's perspective centers on processes of dissociation, of which both neurosis and psychosis are milder and severer versions. This is related to a second, more basic difference, regarding the very definition of psychic energy or libido. Freud defined libido exclusively as sexual energy, whereas Jung defined libido as psychic energy in general, of which sexualized psychic energy is a sub-set arising with the sexual instinct in puberty and preceded by other, pre-sexual libidinal forms. Jung can thus agree with Freud that many neuroses arise from difficulties with sexuality; but whereas for Freud psychosis, too, must arise as a reaction to sexual anxiety (usually a reaction against homosexuality), for Jung psychoses can involve regression to pre-sexual libidinal stages where magical thinking dissociated from reality-testing by the ego prevails.
Finally, and most important, is the disagreement over instincts and their relation to the unconscious. Despite retaining a theory of instinct throughout his career, Freud fairly quickly came to distinguish categorically between the unconscious proper, conceived of as the result of repression, and an older concept of the "id" conceived of as a reservoir of instinctual or biological urges. (Lacan will maintain this distinction even more strenuously than Freud.) His view of instinct, meanwhile, was always a dual or dialectical one, involving Eros and Thanatos late in his career, self-preservation and sexual reproduction earlier in his career. While Jung's theory of instinct resembles Freud's earlier theory, it is not dialectical but evolutionary and developmental: instincts evolve in each human being from a concern for preservation of the organism itself to a concern for the perpetuation of the species. Moreover, Jung's theory is not dualistic but multiple: there are many instincts (not just two), and for Jung they take the form of archetypes; it is here that he draws most directly on Bergson and Kant. The law tells us: You shall not marry your mother, and you shall not kill your father. And we docile subjects say to ourselves: so that's what I wanted! Will it ever be suspected that the law discredits -and has an interest in discrediting and disgracing -the person it presumes to be guilty, the person the law wants to be made to feel guilty? One acts as Problem is "solved" with a negative proscription bearing exclusively on family relations, while in the other, the same Problem is "solved" with a positive though invidious prescription bearing inclusively on caste relations in society as a whole that differentiate royalty from everyone else.
There is a lot more to such a comparison and the contextualizing procedure underlying it than this, but one thing they suggest is that the existence of the psychoanalytic Oedipus Complex depends entirely on the historically contingent institution of the nuclear family, and that it is critical to understand the nuclear family in turn as a strictly capitalist institution. It is crucial to note that this does not mean that the Oedipus Complex doesn't exist, or that psychoanalysis somehow got it wrong: on the contrary, the Oedipus Complex is in an important sense all too real, and the problem with psychoanalysis is that it got it right but does nothing to free us from it; instead, it ends up actually reinforcing our subjection to ultimately capitalist social and familial relations under the guise of promoting personal psychic health.
Now what makes the Oedipal-nuclear family a strictly capitalist institution is this: at the same time that the accumulation of wealth is privatized in the economy, the reproduction of subjectivity is privatized in the family. So it is not simply that the nuclear family is smaller in scope or scale than all other "extended" family forms throughout history (although this result is crucial): it is also that the relations of reproduction in the family are increasingly segregated from the relations of production in the economy (which themselves become increasingly segregated from politics and everyday life). Under capitalism, economic production takes place exclusively outside the family, with the family relegated to being a locus of consumption and reproduction. It is for this reason that Deleuze and Guattari say that of all the modes of production, capitalism fosters the greatest "difference in regime" between social production and what they call "desiring-production," whereas in all other social formations, production relations and "extended" family relations coincide more or less and interconnect.
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Most important, the distinction between desiring-production and social production does not correspond to the distinction between fantasy and reality: desiring-production and social production are equally real, and they are both equally informed, invested, and motivated by fantasy. They are (to revert to the term Deleuze deploys later, in his work on Leibniz and
Foucault, and that we used a moment ago) precisely folds of one another. While it is true that they belong to "different regimes," and that the degree of difference between them varies The complex relations between social production and desiring-production are key to Deleuze and Guattari's transformation of psychoanalysis, and bear closer examination.
historically, ultimately, like instincts and institutions, they are utterly interdependent and "identical in nature," as Deleuze and Guattari put it, comprising the two sides of a single, universal process of production:
There is only one kind of production, the production of the real. And doubtless we can express this identity in two different ways.... We can say that social production, under determinate conditions, derives primarily from desiring-production: which is to say that
Homo natura comes first. But we must also say, more accurately, that desiringproduction is first and foremost social in nature, and tends to free itself only at the end
[of history]: which is to say that Homo historia comes first. [AO 32-33]
Paradoxically, the identical nature of desiring and social production only becomes apparent toward the end of history, under capitalism, where the difference in regime is the greatest. To understand how this is so, we can as a kind of first approximation think of desiring-production as libido and of social production as labor-power. They are both expressions of a single energysource which, as a second approximation, we can consider to be actually akin to and conceptually derived from Nietzschean will-to-power and Bergsonian élan vital. But under capitalism, this single form of energy is divided in two so radically by the wholesale segregation of the relations of reproduction (in the nuclear family) from the relations of production (in the economy) that libido appears to be the proper object and discovery of Freudian psychoanalysis and labor-power the proper object and discovery of Marxian political economy. And, in a limited sense, they are indeed discrete objects or concepts. But schizoanalysis will insist on breaking through the limitations of the disciplinary effects of institutionalized segregation (proclaiming that "Nature = Industry = History" [AO 25]), in order to grasp production as a universal and thereby restore its full critical force, beyond both psychoanalysis and political economy.
One measure of the critical force unleashed by the schizoanalytic axiom that desiringproduction and social production are ultimately identical in nature despite their difference in regime is the insight it affords into the capitalist "solution" to the archetypal Problem of the Mother, alluded to above. Imagine an abstract machine or institution composed of three parts, where one's access to a life-giving source is prevented by the intermediation of a domineering third party. Now note that these are simultaneously the structural dynamics of both the (It should go without saying that there are myriad other ways of imagining, representing, and institutionalizing solutions to the archetypal Problem of separation.) But the point is that this is more than a mere structural homology: the Oedipal-nuclear family provides the perfect training ground in subservience and asceticism (or subservience and other-directed consumerism, when the economy requires it) for the production of "docile" capitalist subjects. Ultimately, not only is the nuclear family a strictly capitalist institution, but psychoanalysis is, too --in that it sanctions, perpetrates, and reinforces the Oedipal psycho-dynamics of castration, obedience, self-denial and deferral so perfectly suited to the socio-dynamics of capital accumulation.
This diagnosis of the nuclear family and Oedipal psychoanalysis as capitalist institutions does not exhaust the power of schizoanalytic critique, however. The importance of historical variation in the relations between desiring-production and social production, initially prompted objects in order to know them, but with its own capacity to make them real (which does require knowledge of them)," and desire is defined --surprisingly --as "the faculty which by means of its representations is the cause of the actuality of the objects of those representations."
To avoid fruitless polemics over the semantics of "sexuality" while retaining the claim of schizoanalysis to be a "materialist psychiatry," we can say that desiring-production is powered by the pleasure-principle, with whatever degree or quality of sexuality pleasure entails. 13 How could desire possibly be understood to "cause the actuality" of its objects by means of representations? For Kant, this is explained by distinguishing between two kinds of "actuality,"
only one of which involves the exercise of reason. Without a grounding in reason, desire causes the actuality of its objects only in the "pathological" form of hallucinations, not in reality; only when informed by reason does desire become will, and thus become able to cause the actuality of its objects in reality: "will... is a causal agent so far as reason contains its determining ground." 14 In order to convert desire into a will that has rational causal agency in reality, however, Kant must rely on his three transcendent Ideas of Reason (Self, World and God), and as we have seen, this is where, with help from Nietzsche, Deleuze parts company with Kant.
For Nietzsche in effect refuses Kant's distinction between irrational-pathological desire and rational will: they become indistinguishable aspects of will-to-power. In stark contrast to the nihilism of modern science and the cult of knowledge for its own sake, Nietzsche's noble artist or overman does not require rational knowledge in order to be a causal agent: he creates his own reality, along with whatever knowledge of it he may require. In a similar vein, but from a very different perspective, Marx highlights the ability of human beings to picture objects in the mind and then produce them in reality, instead of producing them instinctually, as most other species do (Marx cites bees and spiders). Bergson, too, highlights the human propensity to interrupt instinctual motor responses to sensory stimuli in order to generate virtual images of Problems before producing actual solutions to them. Basing their concept of desiringproduction mainly on these sources, Deleuze & Guattari will insist that "desire produces, [and] its product is real.... [and that ] the objective being of desire is the Real in and of itself" [ . With this refusal or "loss of reality" attendant on the Nietzschean demotion of the conventional reality-principle in favor of a principle of real creativity, schizoanalysis in a certain sense favors the perspective of the psychotic over that of the neurotic.
The final and perhaps most basic component of desiring-production drawn from Kant is the notion that the mind functions via syntheses. For Kant, experience is not only ordered according to the a priori's of space and time, but also processed by a set of three mental operations he calls the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition. These syntheses form the basis of all possible knowledge, and understanding how they operate is thus crucial to determining which forms of knowledge are legitimate and which are not. While there are no doubt resemblances between Kant's syntheses and those formulated by Deleuze & Guattari, one difference is key: Kant's syntheses are organized by a unified rational thinking subject in order to produce stable knowledge of a fixed reality, whereas the syntheses of desiring-production are largely unconscious, and operate in order to produce reality itself (in connection with social production) as well as our experience of it. And since the syntheses of desiring-production are largely unconscious, it is not surprising that Deleuze & Guattari should draw on psychoanalysis for their formulation of them.
The connective synthesis of production connects libidinal drives with objects of satisfaction, both physically and perceptually; it incorporates or replaces the Freudian concept of "cathexis".
Crucially, the objects of the connective synthesis are always "partial-objects" (following the perspective of Melanie Klein here, more than that of Freud), in two senses of the term: they are parts of wholes that have yet to be constituted (pertaining to what she called the "paranoidschizoid" stage of development preceding the emergence of a unified ego), and the drives are partial to them because they are invested with erotic value. 15 In line with Freud's dual-instinct model, Klein reduces such value to "good" and "bad"; more in line with Nietzsche and Jung, anything goes; before being fixated on specific organs, erogenous zones, or activities, pleasure can be found or taken almost anywhere; it is not instinctually determined.
Even more important, though, are the psychodynamics of the disjunctive synthesis: for it brings about a suspension or interruption of the connective synthesis of production. The productive energy of connection is matched and counter-acted by a disjunctive energy Deleuze and Guattari call "anti-production" -a concept that effectively incorporates and replaces the Freudian categories of repression, anti-cathexis, and the death instinct. 16 But there are three degrees or modes of anti-production in desiring-production, and much of the critical force of schizoanalysis depends on the relations and distinctions among them. 17 First degree: an infant's mouth (partial object) connects to "a" nipple (not "the Mother's breast": just "a" partial object); some valuable energy-flow is produced (its value is simultaneously and indistinguishably nutritional and erotic); then satiation is achieved, the sucking stops, and the connection is dropped: the nipple is expelled from the mouth; a product has been produced, the intensity of the pleasure taken in the productive process vanishes to zero: production succumbs to anti-production, but not without the latter recording the image of the nipple as an object of satisfaction on a recording-surface Deleuze & Guattari (borrowing from Antonin Artaud) call the Body-without-Organs (henceforth the "BwO").
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Of course, Freud has his own version of this whole process: the repetition compulsion grounded in the death instinct induces humans to seek for the same objects of satisfaction that proscriptive --constitutes a form of repression, and conversely, desiring-production would be completely free only if it could escape from the codes of social representation entirely: at the limit, this is the de-coded form of desire Deleuze & Guattari call "schizophrenia".
In the conjunctive synthesis, finally, a sense of self and conscious awareness emerges; importantly, the consciousness and self-consciousness of the third synthesis arise retrospectively and epiphenomenally relative to the operations of the first two syntheses: "so that's what that was!" "That's me! That's mine!". When the syntheses of production and anti-production conflict systematically, two specific forms of subjectivity result which are noteworthy in part because Freud already identified them as corollaries of one another: the neurotic and the pervert.
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Beyond their symmetrical relation with one another, however, the subjects of neurosis and perversion are noteworthy because they illustrate in dramatic form the position of the third synthesis relative to the interplay of production and anti-production comprising the first two: the subject emerges only as an after-effect of the selections made by desire among various disjunctive and connective syntheses, not as the agent of selection. Neurotics and perverts are not so by voluntary, conscious choice; they are not the agents but the results of involuntary connections and disjunctions made on the BwO by the interplay of forces of production and anti-production that constitute them as subjects. "Normal" adults, meanwhile, typically indulge in the illusion (of sovereign subjectivity) whereby they choose their pleasures and desires, rather than being "chosen," that is to say constituted, by them; Deleuze and
Guattari draw directly on Nietzsche to dispel this illusion and insist that the productions and
In the neurotic, the forces of anti-production prevail: desiringproduction is denied one or more of its own connections by social representations and is constrained to fix on a relatively ungratifying substitute connection (the neurotic symptom),
instead. In the pervert, the forces of production prevail: an unorthodox organ-object connection is maintained despite (or in some cases because of, as in transgression according to Bataille) the social sanctions promulgated to forbid and repress it. As in the prioritization of psychosis over neurosis mentioned above, here too, schizoanalysis favors the perspective of the pervert over that of the neurotic, and the forces of production over the forces of antiproduction.
anti-productions of desire, like "will-to-power," always come first, and the appearance of the subject afterward. This reversal of the relation between process and product, which is crucial to such misrecognition on the part of the subject and conducive to the illusion of sovereign subjectivity, is made possible by the earlier process/product reversal of the disjunctive synthesis, whereby only results of the suspension of the process of connective synthesis register on the BwO, as images of "finished" products. The process of connective synthesis is not just continual: this and then that, and then this, and so on; it is also for that very reason equally evanescent. Desiring-production thus registers permanently in the psyche (gets stored in memory) only when it is attracted by, and its results get recorded on, the BwO. From this point on, what is merely a recording-surface henceforth appears to be the source of what gets recognized in the constitution of the subject in conjunctive syntheses. Finally, the subject in turn claims mastery or ownership of the BwO --or of its products: consummate experience, intensities --when it is in fact a mere derivative of them. The subject as product appropriates and obscures (represses) the very process that constitutes it as subject.
Indeed, even to speak of "the" subject in the singular is in a sense to have already succumbed to the product-process reversal and the illusions of sovereign subjectivity, for even the last of the syntheses produces a subject always different from itself. Just as much as the speaking from the perspective of unified reason, knowledge, and morality, Kant had asserted that the conscious mind utilizes a specific set of processes (the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition) to arrive at knowledge, and had insisted furthermore that knowledge would have to conform to these processes or else stand condemned as metaphysical.
This, too, echoes a Kantian operation: 22 Of critical importance for Kant was the idea that, since these processes were constitutive of conscious thought, they provided immanent criteria for judging knowledge as valid or metaphysical, depending on whether it was based on legitimate or illegitimate use of the three syntheses. In a similar way, but speaking not from the perspective of reason but from that of desire and especially schizophrenic desire, Deleuze and Guattari insist that the unconscious operates according to a specific set of syntheses to process or constitute experience, and that psychoanalysis must either be shown to conform to the immanent criteria provided by these processes or else stand condemned as metaphysical. 23 We start with the paralogism of disfiguration or displacement, which we have already discussed in terms of the post-structuralist critique of representation: disfiguration amounts to mistaking the distorted image of desire (the signified) promulgated by a prohibition (the repressing signifier) for the referent that image displaces: the actual desire getting repressed.
With respect to all five paralogisms, the fundamentally ambivalent makeup of the BwO and the product-process reversal it fosters play a critical role: images of organ-machine connections register on the BwO only when anti-production transforms the process of desiring-production into a finished, arrested, or repressed product, which has the disastrous consequence that fixed properties of the finished product are mis-attributed to the differential process that produced it, obscuring its genesis entirely; differences succumb to identity. And the disaster is this: genetic processes always harbor some potential to actualize differently, and to thereby produce different end- Illegitimate use of the connective synthesis (the paralogism of extrapolation) is global and specific instead of partial and non-specific -Kleinian, in a word, rather than Nietzschean.
Klein was on the right track, according to Deleuze & Guattari, in her elucidation of partialobjects, but went astray in considering them merely a temporary "pre-Oedipal" stage en route to the integration of instincts and drives under the aegis of a unified, sovereign ego. For
Nietzsche and schizoanalysis, the unified ego is an illusion and an epiphenomenon, and objects remain partial in correlation with the partiality of the unconscious forces warring for temporary dominance in the psyche. In this respect, a specific (illegitimate) use of the connective synthesis involves selecting one element of a connective a-signifying chain --the phallus, say, or reason or money --and elevating it permanently to a place or role of privilege over and above all the other elements. Finally, the other thing to be said about the abuse of the connective synthesis is that it usually occurs as an effect of (or at the very least in tandem with) the illegitimate use of the disjunctive synthesis.
Abuse of the disjunctive synthesis (the paralogism of the doube-bind) is exclusive and restrictive rather than inclusive and non-restrictive. This difference underlies the crucial ambivalence of the BwO, which as we have seen allows for the differentiation of drives beyond instinct and habit but also their capture in social repression and neurosis. Inclusive disjunction generates an indiscriminate plurality of modes of satisfaction for the multifarious drives it thereby differentiates, whereas exclusive disjunction restricts the range and form of possible satisfactions to binary pairs and then forces an either/or choice between the paired terms: one must identify as man or woman, gay or straight, and so on. While there is much to be said relation between a tenor that is held constant, on one hand --the Oedipus --and on the other hand a vehicle --comprising all the socio-historical material --that varies substantially but for psychoanalysis enjoys no explanatory power whatsoever. Hence the tiresome, mechanically repetitive quality of most psychoanalytic studies of culture and society: everything amounts to the Oedipus (for Freudians); to lack, castration or the phallus (for Lacanians); or to some "kernel of surplus-enjoyment" (for Zizek).
The fifth paralogism seems in a sense to compensate for the abuse of bi-univocalization;
Deleuze & Guattari call it the paralogism of the afterward. Here, the importance of real social and historical factors in psychic life is granted, but only insofar as they are understood to come after the familial factors, which form Oedipal subjectivity during childhood first. Real social relations are then construed merely as so many "sublimations" of Oedipal relations, which are supposed to be primary, and therefore universal as well: "the child is father to the man," as the saying goes. But for schizoanalysis, it is not the child but the boss who is father to the man, so to speak, and only then is the man father to the child. 24 Oedipal relations are neither primary --inasmuch as they derive, by delegation to the institution of the nuclear family, from the structure and dynamics of capital accumulation --nor universal --inasmuch as the nuclear family is a historically contingent, specifically capitalist institution.
Oedipal psychoanalysis embodies all five of the paralogisms diagnosed by Deleuze & Guattari.
It presupposes that the productive synthesis makes specific whole-object connections to global persons in the family alone instead of general partial-object connections to the natural and social environment at large; that the conjunctive synthesis first constructs subjects within a segregated field of restricted identifications instead of from the entire field of social relations;
and that the disjunctive synthesis, positing a closed either/or alternative, effectively excludes society from the enclosure of the nuclear family altogether. But the family is not separate, not an autonomous and self-contained microcosm; the family is a social institution, and the nuclear family is in fact a capitalist institution. 25 And it is delegated the function of reproduction under capitalism as an apparently separate institution so that social production can proceed to develop and continually revolutionize itself without regard for the reproduction of subjects and the direct management of their desire.
Such delegation explains why the family can appear to be a microcosm, when it really is not; why familially-constructed subjects often seem on one hand so ill-suited to the specific content-requirements of social-production at any given moment of its development; why on the other hand the family's degree of abstraction as an apparently-separate reproductive institution produces subjects perfectly suited formally to a system of social-production in constant flux. For what they learn in the nuclear family is simply to submit as good, docile subjects to prohibitive authority --the father, the boss, capital in general --and relinquish until later, as good ascetic subjects, their access to the objects of desire and their objective being --the mother, the goods they produce, the natural environment as a whole. Far from being autonomous, much less originary, fundamental, or universal, the Oedipus complex of the nuclear family appears as though it had been "fabricated to meet the requirements of... [the capitalist] social formation" [AO 101], from which it in fact derives by delegation. 26 Hence the importance of the critique of representation to the schizoanalytic critique of Oedipal psychoanalysis: in delegating the formation of desire to the nuclear family as system of reproduction-representation, capitalism manages to trap desiring-production in a deceptive and misleading image of itself whose familial content is mostly irrelevant, even while the form of that desiring-production ultimately echoes and reinforces precisely the kind of repression exercised by capitalist social-production itself:
And from the psychoanalytic perspective, to challenge or rebel against Oedipally-constituted authority would amount to... committing incest! Desiring-production and social-production are thus, in a descriptive sense, one and the same process, inasmuch as schizoanalysis sees no need and no room to posit any independent, universal formation of desire such as Oedipus intervening between one and the other: "socialproduction is purely and simply desiring-production itself under determinate conditions" [AO 29 ].
Yet in another, critical sense, desiring-production and social-production are different, inasmuch as schizoanalysis enables and expects us to judge any historical organization of socialproduction according to the immanent criteria provided by desiring-production itself, and thereby expose "the repression that the social machine exercises on desiring-machines" [AO
54]:
From the very beginning of this study, we have maintained both that social-production and desiring-production are one and the same, and that they have differing regimes, with the result that a social form of production exercises an essential repression of desiring-production, and also that desiring-production --"real" desire --is potentially incestuous desires, it would be justified by the natural necessity of the incest taboo, and social repression could be seen as a mere extension or "sublimation" of that natural necessity for the sake of higher civilization (as Freud claims). But such is not the case. Hence the importance of analyzing representation with three terms rather than two, to foil the ruses of representation and refute the Oedipal apology for repression. Psychoanalysis considered psychic repression in the Oedipus complex to be primary and universal, and social repression to be secondary and inevitable. Schizoanalysis, by contrast, ascribes the potential for both psychic and social repression to the registration of desire on the BwO in the first place, due to the primary repression occasioned by anti-production. 27 It is thus able to reverse the causal order proposed by psychoanalysis and show that "psychic repression is a means in the service of social This all-important reversal is in a sense a reversal of a reversal, inasmuch as the paralogisms of psychoanalysis all arose to begin with, as we saw, with a product-process reversal that confused the fixed properties of the finished product with the differential processes that produced it, obscuring its genesis entirely. Hence the critical importance of discovering criteria immanent to the operations of the unconscious: once we can discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate uses of the syntheses of experience, psychoanalysis must either conform to the criteria or be condemned as metaphysical and repressive -and the Oedipus proved on this count to be precisely the metaphysics of psychoanalysis. But schizoanalysis claims to be not just critical in this (Kantian) respect, but revolutionary. The critique of Oedipal psychoanalysis is good as far as it goes, but psychoanalysis serves merely as a discursive reinforcement and representative of the institution of the nuclear family, and the family serves in turn as an institutional delegate of capital for the production of a flexible but abstemious and deferential form of subjectivity. In this light, not just psychoanalysis but society as a whole, its modes of production and reproduction alike, will have to conform to the immanent criteria of the unconscious or else stand condemned as metaphysical and oppressive: in the light of schizoanalysis, it does stand condemned, with the point being ultimately not just to condemn the world, but to change it.
